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Abstract 
The growing prevalence of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) brings great potential 
for public benefit, but in order to fly in civil airspace UAVs must avoid traffic without 
the benefit of an onboard human.  Developing this capability presents many system 
integration challenges.   
This report examines the integration of automated detect, see, and avoid (DSA) 
systems on aircraft.  For context, the need for UAV operations is reviewed.  The report 
then examines how DSA fits into the entire framework for aviation safety.  The research, 
test results, and conclusions that follow provide the necessary information to decide:  
• how to test and evaluate new DSA technology;  
• what is the necessary performance for installed DSA systems;  
• what is currently available and what possibilities are in development.  
 
Finally, after surveying available technologies, recommendations are given for 
some specific UAV platforms and missions.   
This report would be useful for persons engaged in DSA development, acquisition, 
or testing.  It is applicable for all small aircraft because future advances may make DSA 
technology feasible for the entire aviation community.  The emphasis, however, is on 
enabling safe UAV operation world-wide. 
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Introduction 
Numerous aviation accident investigations have concluded that unaided pilots are 
not capable of satisfactorily avoiding each other in today’s airspace;1 therefore, computer 
assistance in the form of collision avoidance systems are now mandatory on all 
commercial aircraft.2  Whether desired or not, computers are very good at helping 
humans avoid one another.  Though the human without the computer may be insufficient, 
currently the reverse is also true.   
The growing prevalence of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)* brings great 
potential for public benefit, but in order to fly in civil airspace† UAVs will require the 
ability to detect, see, and avoid (DSA)‡ traffic without the benefit of an onboard human.  
Doing this presents many system integration challenges unique to typical UAV platforms.  
While there is a very large variety of UAV platforms, most are designed for operations at 
relatively low speed, low maneuverability, and medium altitude.  They are frequently 
propeller (or rotor) driven with light payloads.   
This report examines the integration of DSA systems on such aircraft.  The 
research, test results, and conclusions provide the necessary information to decide:  
• how to test and evaluate new DSA technology;  
• what is the necessary performance for installed DSA systems;  
• what is currently available and what possibilities are in development.  
 
Section 1 examines the motivation for these efforts with a brief look at current and 
proposed UAV applications needing access to controlled airspace.  Section 2 discusses 
the four layers of traffic safety and current issues that affect DSA system development.  
                                                 
Discussion of Terms: 
*  Some sources use the alternate terms: remotely piloted vehicles (RPV), remotely piloted aircraft (RPA), 
remotely operated aircraft (ROA), or uninhabited aerial vehicles.  In Europe, acronyms for terms translated 
as “aircraft not crewed” are normal.  There is no universal agreement.  In this report, the term UAV will be 
used throughout to mean any airborne vehicle that does not have a human being onboard. 
† Civil airspace is used to define that airspace under the control of the civil aviation authority of a particular 
country, sometimes called the national airspace system (NAS), as compared to restricted or special use 
airspace.  NASA has undertaken a similar project called Access 5.  Eurocontrol has undertaken a similar 
project called UAV Safety Issues for Civil Operations (USICO). 
‡  Some sources use the alternate terms: sense-and-avoid (SAA), non-cooperative collision avoidance, or 
autonomous avoidance systems.  “See-and-avoid” is the primary term used in regulatory sources.  In this 
report the term DSA will be used throughout to mean any concept or system in effect for the primary 
purpose of preventing collisions between aircraft that have not been deconflicted by other means.   
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Section 3 proposes a complete list of evaluation topics for DSA systems.  These are 
defined in quantifiable terms so that they are useful for requirements documentation and 
test plan generation.  In Section 4 an assessment of the necessary performance for DSA 
systems is presented and justified.  This is recommended as guidance for the creation of 
threshold and objective criteria.  Section 5 is an evaluation of the current state of the art§ 
and Section 6 provides some recommendations based on platform type and the necessary 
requirements presented in Section 4.   
                                                 
§ The mention of specific companies or products in this report is for illustrative purposes only and does not 
constitute an endorsement by the author. 
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1. Background  
A review of current and potential UAV applications reveals how important it is to 
overcome the challenges that currently prevent routine flight operations. 
1.1. Demand for UAVs in Civil Airspace 
UAVs offer the possibility of operating: for very long periods, at very high 
altitudes, doing tasks too tedious or repetitive for humans, in environments deemed too 
dangerous for humans, at a significant cost savings to piloted aircraft or satellites based 
systems.  However, in the same way their autonomous operation makes them very useful, 
it makes them controversial.  Some see them as an unwarranted safety risk.  This section 
is not an attempt to win over critics but to define the public benefit of such operations as 
a reference when evaluating DSA options.  The following missions are the end goals to 
keep in mind when weighing complex trade offs.  If an option makes UAV flight possible 
but too restricted for the following missions, then it is not a true solution. 
1.1.1. Commercial Applications 
The most visible and direct public benefit will be commercial applications.  Already 
some UAVs, such as the Rmax in Japan, are being used in agricultural applications.  
Plantations in Hawaii have also used UAVs in the same way.  Other services that may 
one day be the work of UAVs include: telecommunications, television and radio 
broadcasting, real time news reporting, and aerial photography.  In addition many private 
companies will be able to make use of the inexpensive flight time for applications such 
as: urban planning, exploration, surveying, and remote area security/safety. 
1.1.2. Civil/Government Applications 
The low cost eye-in-the-sky capability promises to increase security and assist 
government agencies through applications such as: border patrol, counter narcotics, 
counter terrorism, traffic management, surveillance of infrastructure (pipelines, airports, 
railways, roads, waterways, etc.), communications relays, and airborne crime 
reconnaissance.  One current example is SIVA (Figure 1).  The Spanish government 
plans to expand the use of these small inexpensive UAVs for many civil and government 
applications including search and rescue and forest fire patrol.3  In addition UAVs can 
contribute to fishing regulation enforcement, animal and environmental monitoring, and 
atmospheric research. 
One specific example of future possibilities is the Altair (Figure 2) made by General 
Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc.  It is a civilian derivative of the Predator B now in 
operation for the military.  The company hopes it will be the first UAV to meet all 
requirements for routine operation in the national airspace.  In addition to redundant 
avionics and flight control systems, Altair has a traffic collision avoidance system and an 
air traffic control voice relay.  The relay allows air-traffic controllers to talk to ground-
based Altair pilots through the aircraft.4  
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Figure 2: Altair (USA) 
(Source: GA-ASI website, 
Permission granted) 
   
     Figure 1: SIVA (Spain) 
(Source: INTA website,  
Permission granted)
 
1.1.3. Military Applications Requiring Civil Airspace 
The militaries of many nations are currently using, and expanding the use of, a 
plethora of unmanned vehicles on land, sea, air, and space.5  New UAV platforms are 
expected to grow at an even more accelerated rate in the next few decades.6   
Though their wartime operations are much different, these UAVs still have a 
requirement to integrate into civil airspace for transit and training.  Some combat aircraft 
already possess airborne surveillance systems of some type.  This precludes the need for 
a separate system to be installed just for DSA, but it will require some modification.  
There may be problems with getting approval for civilian use without compromising the 
classification of the military application.  Also, there are multiple examples in the piloted 
aircraft world where the lack of accommodation to civil aviation requirements has created 
tension and safety concerns for military aircraft (e.g. F-15s equipped with UHF-only 
radios).  Also, in keeping with the new mandates on technology insertion, rather than new 
technology development, many military programs will likely be pressed to pursue 
commercial off the shelf options.  For all these reasons, any attempt to create military-
specific DSA requirements or specialized systems should only be done after a complete 
analysis of alternatives. 
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2. Layers of Safety 
The true solution for safer, and more accessible, skies will be a composite solution 
consisting of technical advancements and procedural changes that accommodate new 
technology.  As mentioned, this report examines the total framework of air safety.  By 
design, there are four layers that maintain safe operations in aviation.  They are: 
1. Administrative 
2. Air traffic service (ATS) 
3. Cooperative avoidance systems 
4. Detect, see and avoid (DSA) 
 
Individual aircraft development programs do not have influence over the first two 
layers, but program managers should be mindful of how new policies will influence the 
performance requirements of their specific program.  Technical changes at any level must 
be accommodated by regulatory changes to be effective, and those changes need to be 
global to be truly successful.  The proposed evolution of air traffic control into air traffic 
management would effectively swap roles between layers 2 and 3 as the ground-based 
staff move away from active control and the networked aircraft perform more automated 
route deconfliction.  Such is the concept called “Free Flight”. 
2.1. Administrative 
The administration of air transportation is the primary method for maintaining the 
safe and orderly flow of air traffic.  This is done by regulating the airspace, air 
operations, and certification of new systems.  Compared to other layers, it is low tech and 
low cost.  Wise changes here save money and reduce demand on all lower levels.  
However, this layer is neither dynamic (except in the case of NOTAMs) nor flexible.   
Most nations have their own agencies to govern air traffic in the airspace they 
control.  These agencies have the authority to enforce the regulations adopted by their 
respective governments.  Table 1 lists the agencies and governing documents for areas 
with high levels of UAV activity. 
 
Table 1: Chart of Regulatory Agencies and Documents World-wide 
Country Organization Regulation 
Australia Civilian Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) Civil Aviation Legislation 
Europe  
(34 Member 
States) 
European Aviation Safety Authority (EASA), 
European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC)
Joint Aviation Authority (JAA) 
European Organization for the Safety of 
Air Navigation (Eurocontrol),  
European Organization for Civil Aviation 
Equipment (EUROCAE) 
Israel Civil Aviation Administration of Israel 
(CAAI) 
Israeli Air Navigation Regulations 
(ANR) 
United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) 
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The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), a United Nations agency, 
works to harmonize air regulations world-wide through the creation of Standards and 
Recommended Practices (SARPs).  Nations that have agreed to follow the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation are called contracting states.  Almost all controlled airspace 
in the world falls under the jurisdiction of one of the 188 current contracting states.   
SARPs consist of two parts:  A standard is the specification of anything that is 
necessary to be uniformly applied for safe and orderly international air navigation.  
Contracting states are to comply with such standards or notify ICAO why they are 
unable.  A recommended practice is the specification of anything that is desired to be 
uniformly applied for the safe and orderly international air navigation.  Contracting states 
are to endeavor to conform and are invited to inform ICAO of non-compliance.  Where 
needed, Procedures for Air Navigation Services (PANS) are created to amplify SARPs. 
Under the Universal Safety Oversight Audit Program, ICAO performs regular 
mandatory audits to verify safe implementation of all SARPs.  Contracting states that 
chose to not comply with SARPs and PANS are to publish their differences in the 
Aeronautical Information Publications (AIP).  Also, regional supplementary procedures 
(SUPPs) can be made that have authority for only a particular area.7   
UAVs currently have to perform the complete coordination process of each country 
for any airspace they fly through.8  An ICAO-sponsored standard regarding UAV 
operations would not only make flight planning much easier, but it would increase 
aviation safety by creating consistent procedures world-wide.  
2.1.1. Airspace 
One of the primary ways that the before mentioned agencies aid in conflict 
avoidance is by defining airspace.  Table 2 explains the internationally designated 
airspace categories.  Pilots are required to practice see-and-avoid at all times, but the 
responsibility for conflict avoidance changes with the type of airspace.9  In addition, there 
is a speed limitation of 250 knots below 10,000´ MSL and 200 knots in Classes C & D.   
In theory this makes a very straightforward classification of the area above land; 
however, due to factors ranging from the geographical to political, the actual 
implementation of airspace is not so straightforward.  The airspace over the European 
continent is quite fragmented.   
The ECAC is pursuing a more simplified airspace allocation plan called the Single 
European Sky proposal.  In this proposal, ECAC introduces their plan for creating a 
Corresponding Traffic Environment which redefins the existing airspace into only three 
types of airspace by 201010.  The types are defined as:  
N: Intended Traffic Environment.  All traffic position and intentions known to ATS 
K: Known Traffic Environment.  All traffic position known to ATS. 
U: Unknown traffic Environment.  Not all traffic is known to ATS. 
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Table 2: ICAO Airspace Designations and UAV Operations 
(Source: ICAO Annex 11, Appendix 4) 
Class Flight Ops ATC equipment & 
services Provided 
Com. 
Required
Transponder 
Required 
UAV integration 
problems 
A IFR only Radar 
Conflict resolution & 
separation 
Yes Yes None 
ACAS, data link primary 
B IFR/VFR 
By 
permission 
Radar 
Conflict resolution & 
separation 
Yes Yes Moderate problem due to 
high traffic density, 
ACAS, data link primary 
C IFR/VFR 
After contact 
Radar 
Separation (IFR), or 
traffic advisories (VFR)
Yes Yes Possible problem due to 
high traffic density, 
ACAS, data link primary 
D IFR/VFR 
After contact 
Tower 
Separation (IFR) 
Yes No ACAS insufficient,  
DSA system primary 
E IFR/VFR  
Separation (IFR) 
Yes No (<10,000´) ACAS insufficient,  
DSA system primary 
F IFR/VFR 
 
 
Traffic advisories (IFR)
No 
(<10,000´) 
No (<10,000´) ACAS insufficient,  
DSA system primary 
G VFR None No 
(<10,000´)
No (<10,000´) Moderate problem due to 
lack of ATC coverage, 
DSA system primary 
 
  
 
Figure 3 illustrates the lack of standardization in European airspace.  In anticipation 
of the migration from that to the Single European Sky proposal shown in Figure 4, 
European countries have implemented new requirements.  Mode S capable transponders 
are now required for all new aircraft in Class A, B, or C airspace higher than 5,000´ 
MSL.  They will soon be required for all aircraft except in remote locations.  Flying at 
night or in IFR now requires transponders everywhere and for all aircraft.11    
2.1.2. UAV Operations 
Currently, UAVs are restricted to special use airspace.  Permission to fly outside of 
these designated airspaces requires special notification.  In the US, the FAA requires a 
certificate of authorization (COA) which requires at least a 30-day notice to local 
administrators, visual meteorological conditions (VMC)**, a route clear of all populated 
areas, and constant ground control by a certified pilot.12   
Military units pushing for more UAV access to civil airspace have recently been 
helped by advances in the commercial UAV market.  This has led to an increased 
frequency of permitted UAV flights into civil airspace.   
                                                 
** Instrument Flight Rules (IFR), Visual Flight Rules (VFR), Instrument Meteorological Conditions 
(IMC), and Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) are defined more completely in FAR 91. 
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Figure 3: European Airspace Designation by Country 
(Source: Eurocontrol website) 
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 Figure 4: Single European Sky Concept 
(Source: Eurocontrol website) 
 
 
The current policy heavily dampens UAV usage.  Some UAV operations will 
always remain in special use airspace (e.g. experimental tests and target drones), but even 
specialized UAVs need better access to the air route system for transition to/from areas of 
operation.  UAVs could blend in with traffic operating under instrument flight rules (IFR) 
with no need for modified regulations.  In reality, UAVs would have less impact on 
airspace congestion than other types of traffic as their automation will make them more 
precise and predictable than piloted traffic.  Their full intentions can be known and 
deconflicted well in advance.  In addition, UAVs, with their different mission, will 
largely stay clear of high traffic areas.  
From a UAV access perspective, Class A does not present a particular difficult 
problem as air routing solves the problem.  The American UAV Global Hawk is already 
given frequent approval to travel at high altitudes over most of the world and with a 
minimum of pre-coordination.13  Even with this, however, Global Hawk must first climb 
to altitude within restricted airspace. 
With an installed collision avoidance system, as discussed in Section 3, safe UAV 
operation in Class B or C is technically possible.  As with other aircraft, they would only 
be necessary for short transitions.  Due to the high traffic volume, however, there is likely 
to be opposition to granting access to UAVs. 
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Accommodation in Class D and E, and G (and in Europe, F), is a problem because 
aircraft flying under VFR at lower altitudes are not required to have transponders.  It is 
the presence of these aircraft, and the freedom that they enjoy, that presents a challenge 
for UAVs to join the skies.  As discussed in Section 2.3, a collision avoidance system is 
not sufficient for traffic deconfliction.  These same areas are the primary operating region 
for small UAVs.  These areas have lower traffic densities, but, except for Class G, they 
will still have ATS control.  Class G is the most problematic as there are no requirements 
for radar coverage or communication.  
Under the proposed European airspace designations there would be little or no 
difficulty integrating UAVs into Class N and Class K.  Class U would present all the 
same challenges of the current Class E (below 10,000´), Class F, and Class G. 
2.1.3. Certification 
Another way that aviation agencies increase safety is through their certification 
processes.  As discussed in the previous section, ICAO SARPs and detailed annexes 
provide commonality for certification, but the individual agencies actually grant the 
certifications.  The multiple approval processes include: registration, airworthiness, 
aircrew/operator licensing, and facility certification.14  
Many of the regulations covering these certifications will only require minor 
changes to accommodate UAVs.  The UAV community should make every effort to 
conform to already established certification requirements; however, there are currently no 
common airworthiness requirements for UAVs.15  When creating regulations for UAVs 
certification and operation, it will be important for UAVs to be categorized by the ICAO 
definition of aircraft.  One near term possibility is to use the restricted category as defined 
in FAR 21.25 & 91.313 to allow operation but to prohibit some airspace.  
It is reasonable for a tiered structure for avionics capabilities based on UAV class.  
This is analogous to the differences in regulation between crop dusters and transatlantic 
airliners.  The challenge, though, is to make a reasonable classification of the plethora of 
UAVs.  At the Spanish test center in Torrejón, and in other agencies under Eurocontrol 
(See Table 1), UAVs are grouped similarly to that shown in Table 3.  
 
Table 3: Proposed UAV Classification  
Class Description Current 
Example 
Operating 
Altitude 
[ft] 
Range 
Restriction 
Cruise 
Speed 
[kts] 
Max Weight 
[lb] or [ kg] 
3 High Altitude, Long 
Endur. (HALE); 
Stratospheric 
Global Hawk, 
Aerosonde 
>35,000 Beyond LOS >250 >4500 >2000
2 Medium Altitude, 
Long Endur. (MALE);  
Eagle, Predator 35,000 Beyond LOS < 250 4500 2000 
1 Short range SIVA, ALO, 
Pioneer 
18,000 LOS only < 150 1100 500 
0 Mini, and micro R-Max, 
MicroStar 
<1,000 LOS only < 100 45 25 
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 Figure 5: UAV Categorization by Flight Envelope Location 
(Source: Eurocontrol IABG Report, 2001) 
 
 
Other classifications exist, but this grouping emphasizes the significant differences 
for purposes of airworthiness and air traffic regulations.  A UAV should be classified by 
whatever parameter gives it the highest classification with respect to altitude.  Figure 5 is 
taken from a study sponsored by Eurocontrol which draws a correlation among existing 
UAVs between weight and the performance envelope.  This reinforces that UAVs can be 
effectively classified as in Table 3.  The grouping is important because it allows 
regulations to be constructed that are realistically safe but not too burdensome for the 
intended use of the vehicle.  
2.2. Air Traffic Service 
The second layer of safety for all aviation is the air traffic service or air traffic 
system (ATS).  It has traditionally been referred to as air traffic control (ATC) and is now 
more frequently being titled air traffic management (ATM) to highlight the eventual 
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evolution towards less controlling and more managing.  Whatever the terminology used, 
this level is active, third party, and higher cost than the first layer.  However, it is real 
time and flexible.  Duties range from pre-coordinated flight plan filing to active radar 
separation.  The principle technologies involved are the primary surveillance radar and 
secondary surveillance radar (SSR).  Primary radar detects all traffic by returns of radar 
energy reflected from the aircraft surface.  As such, it is independent but possesses less 
capability for situational awareness.  SSR detects cooperating traffic by receiving the 
reply signal from the aircrafts´ transponder. 
Many technical and regulatory changes are planned for the ATM world.  Figure 6 
shows the latest system proposal known as future air navigation system (FANS).  It is 
heavily based on satellite communication (SATCOM) and global navigation satellite 
system (GNSS) technology.  It is also planned to rely heavily on some type of data link 
such as the aircraft communication and reporting system (ACARS).  The third layer, 
cooperative traffic avoidance, is expected to play a much larger role.16   
How will this affect UAVs?  If ever implemented, this would theoretically eliminate 
the need for a DSA system on UAVs.  Instead, UAVs would need to implement the 
required data links.  In reality, the need for DSA systems must still be pursued for several 
reasons.  (1) Mandatory participation in the data link is many years off, and it is not 
certain.  (2) When implemented, there are still likely to be regions in which general 
aviation aircraft are not required to participate, similar to the current regions where no 
transponder is required.  (3) Finally, all aircraft will still need a backup capability in the 
event of network failures. 
 
 
Figure 6: The Future Air Navigation System 
(Source: Honeywell website, Permission granted) 
© 1996, 2002, Honeywell Int’l Inc.  All rights reserved.
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 2.3. Cooperative Traffic Avoidance 
The third layer consists of onboard systems that cooperatively work to deconflict 
traffic.  These systems are independent of, but compatible with, ATM detection systems.  
Such systems enable aircrews to perform deconfliction on their own.  They are active, 
first or second person but are “high tech” and high cost.  The current weakness of 
cooperative systems is the necessity for all aircraft involved to have a compatible 
functioning system.  As discussed here, multiple proposals are being explored for ways to 
add information for traffic that is not self reporting.  This has great potential as an 
independent automated traffic control technology. 
2.3.1. Aircraft Collision Avoidance Systems (ACAS) 
A more advanced system is the ACAS, formerly called traffic collision avoidance 
system (TCAS).  As mentioned earlier they function on the signals from the transponder.  
The purpose of an ACAS system is to track other aircraft based on their transponder 
signal as shown in Figure 7.  There are currently three versions of the ACAS system in 
use or in some stage of development; TCAS I, II, and ACAS. 
TCAS I is simple and less expensive, primarily for general aviation use. It can 
interrogate transponders on other aircraft and indicate approximate bearing and relative 
altitude (for Mode-C transponders).  It has a range of about forty miles. If another aircraft 
becomes a potential collision threat, a traffic advisory (TA) is created to alert the pilot.  
The pilot must visually identify the intruder and resolve the conflict or receive assistance 
from an air traffic controller.  
TCAS II is more capable, but the cost to integrate it is about $200,000 US.  This 
system has been required on all commercial air carriers in the United States since 1994.  
In addition to TCAS I capability can issue a resolution advisory (RA) to advise the pilot 
what evasive maneuver will deconflict the traffic.  There are two types of RAs, 
preventive and positive. Preventive RAs instruct the pilot not to change altitude or 
heading to avoid a potential conflict. Positive RAs instruct the pilot to climb or descend 
at a predetermined rate of 2500 feet per minute to avoid a conflict.  TCAS II is capable of 
interrogating Mode-C or Mode-S. In the case of both aircraft having Mode-S 
interrogation capability, the TCAS II systems communicate with one another and issue 
deconflicted RAs.   
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Figure 7: ACAS (TCAS) Advisory Envelopes 
(Source: Rannoch Corp. website, Permission granted) 
ACAS is virtually the same as TCAS II but will allow pilots who receive RAs to 
execute lateral deviations as well as climbs/descents.17 
2.3.2. Mode-S 
The Mode-S data link is a related, but separate, technology development.  Through 
this link an aircraft will be able to transmit more aircraft information than the older 
Mode-C.  The basic implementation of this capability is called elementary surveillance 
(ELS) and enables aircraft identification, altitude, flight status, system capability reports, 
and resolution advisories.  The more expensive enhanced surveillance (EHS) capabilities 
include reports on velocity, turning, and vertical intentions.18 
2.3.3. ADS-B 
Automatic dependent surveillance, broadcast (ADS-B) is a dependent and 
cooperative surveillance system that holds great promise.  The principle is to 
automatically transmit various aircraft parameters (identification, position, intended 
route, and speed) via data link to other aircraft and ground stations.  The recipients can 
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then process or reject the messages based on position.  While the ADS-B technology is 
merely a communication means, its application for airspace surveillance and traffic 
deconfliction is defined in the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics publication 
RTCA /DO-181A.  Also, it is being examined for use with automated avoidance 
maneuver systems.  Before implementation it would have to be integrated with current 
surveillance systems.  EUROCONROL´s ADS program and the FAA´s Safe Flight 21 
program are currently testing this data link.  Three options have been proposed:  
• Mode-S “extended squitter” or 1090 data link 
• Very high frequency (VHF) Data link (VDL) Mode 4 
• UAT  (Universal access transceiver)  
 
Mode-S is already in place and the “extended squitter” only requires a software 
modification whereas the other options require new equipment.  For operation, the 
transponder transmits a data string, or squitter, that is twice as long as the current 56 bit 
Mode-S squitter.  The total ADS-B message requires several squitters which transmit 
with various update rates.  The system is capable of a large traffic volume, and the 
possible range is between 60 and 100 NM.  The extended squitter protocol has been 
standardized by ICAO and its necessary EUROCAE/RTCA documentation has been 
published. 
VDL Mode 4 is a self-organizing time division multiple access (STDMA) system.  
It is GPS synchronized, and users transmit during reserved slots based on a reservation 
map.  Each message is 256 bits.  For more capacity, a ground station can regulate usage 
or more frequencies can be added.  VDL has very good range (140 and 200 NM), and its 
protocol has been standardized by ICAO and is detailed in EUROCAE/RTCA 
documentation.  It was developed in Sweden and is supported by the Swedish Civil 
Aviation; however, it does not appear to be the data link of choice for either the other 
European or American aviation agencies. 
The UAT was developed in America by MITRE.  Unlike VDL Mode 4, the 
equipment operates on one single frequency and is capable of functioning in any aviation 
frequency band.  It has a data exchange rate of 1 million bits per second (Mbps).  In the 
UAT concept, users transmit a data structure, of about 3200 data slots, every second.  
UAT does not require synchronization and allows messages of 128 or 256 bits to be 
transmitted, including all information required by DO-242.  The FAA has tested 
prototypes and has chosen it (along with the Mode-S extended squitter data link) for 
ADS-B; however, it has not been standardized by ICAO and no RTCA documentation 
has been created.19 
Like ACAS, ADS-B requires all traffic to have working transponders.  As shown in 
Table 2, this requirement is met in Class A, B, and C airspace, but it does not provide 
protection in the rest of the civil airspace where nonparticipating aircraft are allowed.  
This was the reason for the development of TIS-B, as described in the next section. 
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2.3.4. Traffic Information Services-Broadcast (TIS-B) 
The FAA, as part of Project Safe Flight 21, is evaluating an additional capability 
called TIS-B.  In this system traffic information from ground surveillance sources is 
broadcast to ADS-B equipped aircraft.  Updates will come about every 5 to 20 seconds 
(as compared to every second for ADS-B broadcasts).  This will complete the air traffic 
picture in airspace where not all aircraft are using transponders.  A current advisory-only 
service is in use.  
This system is still limited to the areas that have both radar coverage and an ADS-B 
broadcast source.  Also, more development is needed in the processes that correlate ADS-
B reports with corresponding radar returns from the same aircraft.   
2.3.5. Cooperative Avoidance Options for UAVs  
Small UAVs not originally designed to carry transponders can take advantage of 
some new developments targeted at the recreational flying community.  A class of light 
aviation transponder has been designed and approved specifically for small aircraft.  By 
definition it is Class 2 equipment restricted to use below 15,000´ and 175 knots, but it 
will fulfill the requirements of the Eurocontrol ELS and complies with ICAO Annex 10 
Amendment 77.  Several manufacturers are marketing them with Mode-S capability. 
In order to use the information being reported by other participating aircraft, UAVs 
must be equipped with an ACAS or a traffic advisory system (TAS).  L-3 Avionics 
Systems has developed a TAS, called Skywatch and Skywatch HP, specifically for small 
aircraft.  It is low weight (11 pounds), low power (160 W), and low cost (approx. $25,000 
US).  It is capable of detecting cooperative traffic at distances in excess of 35 NM and 
generating corresponding alerts and advisories for transmission to the ground control 
station (GCS).  This system has been tested by NASA and is being considered by the US 
Navy.20  This possibility is one of the recommended alternatives discussed in Section 6. 
2.3.6. Issues to “See and be Seen” 
As an aside, the UAV community must improve their own “seeing and being seen”.  
Due to their generally smaller size and lack of reflective surfaces such as windshields, 
UAVs make harder visual targets.  While this may be desirable for military applications, 
it is a negative characteristic in civil airspace.  Some authors have proposed incorporating 
things such as sequential lighting flashes and high visibility paint as passive methods to 
improve visibility.  Also, “wing flash” maneuvers and automated radio call outs may be 
programmed to correspond to traffic advisories from installed DSA equipment.  To date, 
no regulatory agencies have discussed making any of these options mandatory. 
2.4. Detect, See and Avoid  
The last layer of safety is the independent ability for each aircraft to detect and 
avoid other aircraft.  In uncontrolled airspace, the inherent freedom means that all 
responsibility for separation lies with the pilot.  In other airspace, see and avoid is still 
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required to be practiced to the maximum extent possible.  The primary example of DSA 
is human scanning, but some aircraft (mostly military) augment this with systems using 
radar or other means of detection.  Ironically for UAVs, the fact that other aircraft have 
pilots makes it necessary for UAVs to have DSA.  Relative to other layers of safety, DSA 
is “high tech” and high cost.  Options for use are covered in Section 5. 
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3. DSA System Evaluations 
The following is a list of evaluation topics (also called system performance 
parameters and system characteristics) that must be considered in order to evaluate the 
effectiveness and suitability of a DSA system: 21  
1. System Performance 
1.1. Time to collision  
1.2. Tracking accuracy 
1.3. Field of regard 
1.4. Integrity 
2. Physical characteristics 
2.1. Size and Shape 
2.2. Weight 
2.3. Physical interference 
2.4. Power and Cooling 
3. Interoperability 
3.1. Aircraft interface 
3.2. Electromagnetic interference/Compatibility 
3.3. External compatibility 
4. Human factors 
5. Logistics  
 
These are quantifiable and should be addressed in any decision making process.  
While any unsatisfactory result is a problem, these topics are ranked in the normal order 
of product development.  For example, new systems generally must meet performance 
thresholds in concept demonstrators or prototypes.  Then, viable alternatives can be 
evaluated based on the platform-specific limitations of physical characteristics and other 
requirements.  Evaluating these systems in the most efficient manner requires a 
sequential test program through laboratory, ground, and flight test phases.   
3.1. System Performance 
For DSA technology, the ultimate performance requirement is:  provide traffic 
conflict information in sufficient time to prevent midair collisions.  A test program to 
fully prove DSA system effectiveness in realistic scenarios would require thousands of 
flight hours involving many aircraft.  Judicious use of design of experiments (DOE) 
principles can significantly reduce the test matrix while maintaining a high confidence 
level.  Even more reductions can be made by quantifying the critical technical parameters 
that are necessary to achieve success and using those values as performance 
requirements.  Using these lower-level criteria reduces time and cost because it makes 
laboratory and ground testing possible and reduces necessary flight testing.  
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3.1.1. Time to Collision  
Defining a sufficient amount of reaction time is not trivial.  The DSA system must 
detect traffic with sufficient time for the remaining evasion steps to occur.  The time 
before collision (tc- ) is a function of detection range and aircraft velocity as follows: 
c
c- v
R  t =  3.1 
where: 
R – Range to target at time tc- 
vc – Closure velocity (or range rate). 
 
In real life vc is not a constant value and is based on both aircraft velocities (v1, v2) 
and the angles in azimuth ( ) and elevation (Ψ Θ ) between the two aircraft as shown: 
)coscos()coscos( 222111 )(Θ)(Ψ·( v)(Θ)(Ψ·v(  dtdR  vc  +  ==  3.2 
 
For radar systems the maximum Range (Rmax) is given by Stimson22 as: 
 
( ) SystemsRadar4
A
4
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2max Sπ
tGσP
R oteavg=  3.3 
 
where:  
Pavg – Average power 
G – Antenna gain   
σ – Target radar cross section (RCS)  
Ae – Effective antenna area.  (Product of the physical area and an efficiency factor) 
tot – Time on target, dwell time, or integration time 
Smin – Minimum detectable signal energy 
 
Except for RCS and dwell time, these parameters are all limitations of the physical 
system.  Increases in range through increases in the power, gain, or area invariably come 
with consequence in weight, size, power, and money.   
The frequency of operation is also a significant factor as it affects the gain, size, and 
weight of the system.  It is also given by Stimson as: 
( )
SystemsRadar
4
2λ
Aπ
G e=  3.4 
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where:  
λ – Wavelength (equal to the speed of light (c) divided by frequency (f); λ= c/f) 
 
Thus, the aperture size decreases or the gain increases proportionally to the square 
of the frequency.  This makes radar systems operating at higher frequencies attractive 
options for UAV installation where payload is limited.   
For target RCS, most specifications use a 3 m2.  To effectively use the dwell time 
parameter, it is important to design a good scanning technique as discussed later.  The 
optimal dwell time is a trade off with revisit rate and field of regard (FOR).  The longer 
one dwells in any one part of the sky, the longer it takes to view the total area of 
observation. 
For infrared imaging systems, the range is related to angular resolution by23: 
 
R = WR/ΘR       Infrared Systems 3.5 
where:  
WR – Linear resolution (minimum resolvable distance or diameter of target) 
ΘR – Angular resolution [rad].  The inverse of the spatial cut-off frequency (fs, co) 
 
For all imaging systems, the resolution is a function of the number of picture 
elements (pixels).  A higher pixels count means dots to fill the image which leads to 
greater resolution.  However, high resolution imaging creates challenges for the 
processing system because of the large quantities of data that must be analyzed in real 
time.   
For systems using laser technology the maximum detection range is determined by 
the required power (PR ) which can be determined by the laser range equation given by 
the U.S. Test Pilot School Handbook24 as: 
SystemsLaser
4
2
2
2
RCVRXMTRATM
TXMTR
R R
DPP ηηηρ ⋅⋅=  3.6 
 
where:  
R – Range to target 
PXMTR  -- Power in the transmission path of the laser 
D – Detector aperture diameter 
ρT – Target reflectivity  
ηATM – Transmissivity, atmospheric  
ηXMTR – Transmissivity, transmission path of the laser  
ηRCVR – Transmissivity, receiver path of the detector  
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Unless a system is capable of simultaneous omni-directional monitoring, this stated 
tc- is not sufficient.  After detection, the DSA system must track the traffic to determine if 
a conflict exists.  This requires at least three scans for accurate determination (real world 
trajectories will be arcs).  Thus the tc- is also a function of revisit rate.  It must be assumed 
that the traffic is just outside of maximum detection range in the previous scan.  Thus the 
distance the traffic can close before being detected and tracked is equal to the closure rate 
times the time the system takes to perform three complete scans (3·tr).  Substituting this 
into equation 3.1 yields an actual time to collision of: 
 33 r
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As mentioned before, a longer dwell time increases the range for radar systems.  
For electro-optical systems, an increase in range requires an increase in sensitivity which 
also requires a longer dwell time.  However, these longer dwell times increase the time 
required to scan the entire area.  Therefore, revisit rate and maximum detection range are 
conflicting parameters of the time to collision requirement.  This necessary trade off is 
seldom discussed in product literature, but it should be considered for new system 
evaluation. 
Section 4 discusses the necessary performance for the time to collision requirement.  
From the DSA system perspective, it must complete its detection, tracking, and 
predicting in adequate time for an avoidance maneuver.  For operations that are not LOS 
the time requirement is lengthened by the necessary relay time.  Onboard automated 
avoidance maneuver systems would be much more responsive, but they add another level 
of yet unproven technology. 
Predicted performance can be obtained from the given equations.  The necessary 
parameters will be available from applicable regulations or manufacturer data.  This 
performance can be evaluated in laboratory tests, but flight tests are still necessary to 
verify all derived results in a real world environment.  Certification will require 
verification flight tests as well. 
3.1.2. Tracking Accuracy 
The accuracy of the system must be evaluated in order to determine the level of 
uncertainty for each track.  Once determined, errors for range, range rate, azimuth angle, 
and elevation angle must be used in the preceding calculations.  This is so that, even with 
errors present, the necessary time to collision requirement would be met.  Most errors can 
be predicted by using the given performance equations and estimating parameter 
uncertainties. 
The minimum ambiguity in range and resolution can be determined through 
equations specific to the system technology, and these variables can be checked in 
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laboratory testing.  The determination of actual system accuracy can only be 
accomplished through flight test with a proven truth source for comparison. 
3.1.3. Field of Regard 
The field of view (FOV) is the angular amount a system can observe at one time.  
Field of regard (FOR) is the complete area that the system can put into its FOV through 
slewing or other means.  For fixed sensors the FOR is equal to the FOV.  Some sources 
use the term scan envelope instead.  Limitations such as obstructions and gimbal limits 
may create an unsymmetrical FOR. 
It is necessary for a DSA system to provide coverage in the entire area of 
responsibility.  Ideally, the system would provide +/-180° in azimuth (AZ) and +/-90 ° in 
elevation (EL); that is, total coverage.  As Section 4 discusses, however, total coverage is 
not required. 
The threshold requirement for the FOR must be established by regulation.  Installed 
system ground tests can evaluate the system FOR. 
3.1.4. Integrity 
System integrity is a measure of how well the data can be trusted.  For a DSA 
system it is the probability for missed traffic, false alarms, or incorrect prioritization of 
intruders.  The technical reasons for these problems include target location ambiguities, 
improper noise rejection, terrain reflections, and errors by predictive algorithms.  The 
tracking accuracy also plays a part as discussed previously. 
Ideally, the system would have a 0 % probability of missed traffic and a 0 % error 
rate.  This is impossible to achieve much less evaluate.  Aviation systems already have 
established threshold levels of safety that apply to these systems.  If a DSA system is 
functioning as the primary method of separation, and traffic on a conflicting flight path is 
non-cooperative, then a missed or incorrect detection could lead to a midair collision.  In 
this scenario, the chance of a collision is a compound probability consisting of the 
statistical chance of two aircraft being on intersecting flight paths, both arriving at the 
same point at the same time, and the DSA system not detecting or predicting it would 
happen.  If a mishap were to occur it would fall under the definition of a catastrophic 
event and so requires the probability of occurrence to be less than 10-9 events/hour.25  
That is once every billion hours of operation.  This can only be realistically evaluated in 
modeling and simulation. 
Conversely, a false alarm or incorrect prioritization qualifies as an annoyance 
factor.  Determining an acceptable frequency of occurrence for these requires some 
subjective analysis, but should be considered a human factors issue as discussed in 
requirement 4.  
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System integrity also concerns evaluations of self-monitoring and graceful 
degradation.  A critical system, such as DSA, must detect its own degraded operation and 
alert the user.  It must also be capable of continuing at the best level possible in the 
presence of partial failures.  An example of this is a detection system that loses its 
vertical scanning capability, but reacts by: detecting the failure, alerting the user, and 
continuing to report traffic in azimuth only. 
Requirements for failure alerts and information reliability will very likely model 
those developed for other traffic systems such as ACAS.  Evaluation and certification 
must be done in laboratory testing where deliberate failures can be executed. 
3.2. Physical Characteristics 
The physical characteristics of a proposed DSA system regard the issue of 
suitability for a particular aircraft.  The actual values for these criteria will be platform-
specific, but all categories must be considered. 
3.2.1. Size and Shape 
Is there room?  This criterion is the limiting factor on many radar systems.  Lower 
frequencies require larger antennae.  The shape is also important as there are possible 
aerodynamic concerns for the externally mounted sections.  A recent C-130 missile 
detection system encountered unexpected problems in this area and required 
modification, wind tunnel tests, and multiple additional flight test hours. 
For complete size criteria the following limitations must be stated:  (1) the 
maximum available dimensions at all internal installation locations. (2) The external 
surface area available for mounting, or availability of attachment points. 
Determining the external shape requirements is more difficult.  There are no 
textbook answers, but limitations will be encountered from one of two possibilities: either 
the contribution to parasitic drag, or flying qualities degradation.  Wind tunnel tests are 
required.  Flying qualities flight testing may be necessary. 
3.2.2. Weight 
The system weight limitations are derived from more that just payload capacity.  If 
the weight and balance of the aircraft are significantly altered, it is an issue for stability 
and control.  Also, there may be structural issues due to increased loads in specific areas.  
Analysis must be performed for each proposed installation location to determine the 
maximum permissible weight.  Threshold limitations can probably be established by 
deduction with the aid of aircraft manufacturer data; however, some of the flying 
qualities data may need to be re-verified by wind tunnel and flight test.   
3.2.3. Physical Interference 
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The physical interference challenge is the most significant limitation of propeller-
driven aircraft.  The propeller and engine greatly limit options for systems that require 
unobstructed forward views with a high FOR.  Many small UAV designs are 
incorporating pusher-type propulsion systems which frees up the front, but it inhibits rear 
traffic detection.  Mounting systems on the wings is possible, but structures limitations 
often make this option difficult as well. 
3.2.4. Power and Cooling 
The power and cooling limitations are determined by evaluating excess capability 
of the system.  All electronics use power and produce heat, so if available aircraft 
capabilities are insufficient, DSA installation will have to be accompanied by an upgrade 
in the power system and/or cooling system.  This may significantly increase total cost.   
Power requirements can be satisfactorily determined from manufacturer data and 
laboratory testing.  Cooling requirements can be estimated in the same manner, but 
normally require installed ground tests for more accuracy. 
3.3. Interoperability 
DSA systems, by definition, are independent of other layers of safety however; they 
must operate as a “system of systems”, both among other onboard systems as well as in 
the surrounding airspace. 
3.3.1. Internal Interfaces 
The DSA system will need ownship data (velocity, altitude, heading, and rates) in 
order to calculate and display traffic information.  It must be able to get this information 
by interfacing with the other onboard systems.  This means being properly integrated into 
the aircraft bus, if one exists, or being wired to other systems and using the proper 
communication protocols.   
This requirement can be evaluated in laboratory tests. 
3.3.2. Electromagnetic Interference/Compatibility  
All new developmental efforts that emit or receive emissions must be concerned 
about the effect of operating among other systems.  Unexpected problems in this area 
have cost the recent Link-16 data link development effort millions of dollars.  In addition 
to added expense, problems with electromagnetic interference/compatibility (EMI/EMC) 
can have critical safety and legal implications.  Changes are much cheaper to make 
before aircraft installation, so a detailed evaluation of the possible risks is paramount.   
EMI/EMC testing requires specialized equipment during ground tests. 
3.3.3. External Compatibility 
In addition to EMC, DSA systems will have to demonstrate that they do not degrade 
the integrity of information for other traffic control systems.  For example, if queried by 
another aircraft using an ACAS or ADS-B system (as discussed in Section 3), the UAVs 
must be able to properly respond with valid data in a compatible format. 
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This requirement can be evaluated in laboratory tests and verified concurrently with 
other flight tests. 
3.4. Human Factors 
Human factors evaluations examine the suitability of the system for real world use.  
Since DSA systems are not a part of the primary mission, it needs to operate with the 
minimum of operator attention.  Inputs and responses must be able to be performed while 
taking a very small percentage of the operator’s time.   
To achieve this, the controls and displays must be evaluated for clarity and logical 
man machine interface (MMI).  In addition, any algorithms used to aid operator decisions 
must be timely and accurate.  Standardized symbology should be used to the maximum 
amount that such exists.  The system should be capable of accurate prioritizing and 
correlating of traffic.  The operator should have the ability to selectively declutter or 
adjust display settings.  Finally, all warnings and alerts must be clear and sufficiently 
intrusive. 
No generic values can be given for the evaluation of these requirements, but they 
are not totally subjective.  Many studies have attempted to quantify acceptable human 
factors.  The applicable regulations should be used.  Human factors evaluations require 
flight time as they must be used in the actual operational environment, however, they 
should be performed concurrently with other activities. 
3.5. Logistics 
The logistical considerations for any new technology are the things that decide if a 
good concept can actually be a good product.  The three main issues for logistical 
considerations are reliability, maintainability, and availability.26  For DSA systems they 
can be quantified as: 
Reliability = hours of operation / operational failures   [hours]  
  - known as mean time between failure or (MTBF) 
Maintainability = maintenance hours / operating hours 
  - known as Maint. Ratio (MR).  Function of MTBF and required servicing. 
Availability = MTBF / (MTBF + maintenance time) [%] 
  - the amount of time the system will be available for use. 
 
The last two issues are concerns for their cost and operational impact, but reliability 
is a safety of flight concern.  As such, a regulatory value must be established for this 
issue.  Logistics evaluations are conducted concurrently with other testing and for the 
duration of the test program.   
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4. DSA Necessary Performance 
Governing agencies have required UAVs to demonstrate an “equivalent level of 
safety” (ELOS) to manned aircraft27.  A complete definition of exactly what that is would 
offer an answer to the question of, “How good is good enough?” for DSA systems on 
UAVs.  If that were done, airworthiness requirements could be directly derived from that 
definition.  Unfortunately, no such definition has been endorsed by any regulating 
agency.  While many vendors present their proposals as “how much better than nothing”, 
many critics emphasize “how much less than perfect”.   
4.1. Equivalent Level of Safety 
While ICAO regulations do not define the required level of DSA performance, they 
have established see and avoid areas of responsibility.28  Studies from multiple research 
agencies are listed in Table 4 as technical answers to the equivalent level of safety of a 
human pilot; however, those same studies also note that this level is not adequate.29 
As shown in the notes, the warning time needed prior to a potential collision is 
based on two things.  The first component is the reaction time to the collision threat.  
Research for this component has been performed by the Australian Traffic Safety Board 
(formerly BASI).  Their results are listed in Figure 8.  These values are generally 
accepted by the aviation community and have been cited in multiple accident 
investigations and subsequent research.  Since they apply to piloted aircraft, they require 
modification for UAV operations (see Section 4.2.1).   
 
Table 4: Required Performance and Human Ability 
Parameter Required Performance Source of 
requirement 
Human 
performance 
Source 
Time to Collision 
Warning 
No value given 
Sufficient for a safe miss distance 
(>500’).  Speed dependent 
FAA-P-8740-51. 
FAA Order 8700.1, 
Ch. 169 
Requires 
greater than 
18.2 sec.  1 
1991 BASI 
report 
& calculations 
 Detection 
Range 
No value given 
Sufficient to achieve warning time 
requirement 
N/A 1.14 to 1.84 
NM 
for 90% 
confidence 
Lincoln Labs 
test, 1989. 
AFRL Study, 
2002 
 Revisit 
Rate 
Sufficient to achieve tracking 
within warning time requirement 
N/A 16 sec FAA-P-8740-
51 
 Resolution Sufficient to achieve tracking at 
required range. 
N/A 0.3 mrad “Modern 
Optical 
Engineering” 
W. Smith 
Field of Regard  +/-110° Azimuth 
+/-30° Elevation 
(ICAO Annex 2) 
“Rules of the Air” 
+/-180° AZ 
+/-30° EL  
N/A 
Traffic Volume Sufficient for most crowded 
airspace (up to 12) 
Derived from 
EUROCONROL 
website statistics link 
Up to 5 FAA-P-8740-
51 
Note:  1: That is, 12.5 seconds for pilot and 5.7 seconds for avoidance maneuver (non fighter or aerobatic). 
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 Figure 8: Tim e to R eact to a C ollision Th reat 
(Source: B A SI Report, 1991) 
 
 
The aircraft lag time of two seconds is the one component of the reaction time that 
is system dependent.  Both the time for aircraft systems to respond to the control input, 
and the time to reach the desired flight attitude are included in this time.  Evaluations 
done at INTA confirmed that this value is appropriate for aircraft that are not designed 
for high agility operations.   
The second component is the time required for the aircraft to complete the 
avoidance maneuver.  Engineers at INTA did not find any prior research for determining 
the required maneuver time for a given speed and bank angle.  A study was undertaken to 
define this component for all aircraft including UAVs.  The conclusions are explained 
below. 
4.1.1. Conclusions of INTA Study on Avoidance Maneuvers 
Due to the closer proximity of traffic, avoidance maneuvers for DSA systems will 
have to be much more abrupt than those programmed for cooperative systems such as 
ACAS.  An aircraft will avoid a hazardous incident, as defined by the FAA, if it is able to 
alter its flight path in order to remain at least 500 ft from the traffic.   
In the vertical plane, the UAVs tested at INTA operate with too little excess thrust 
or airspeed for a zoom maneuver (rapid climb) to be a viable option.  This is true for most 
all small aircraft.  A dive would yield the most rapid change in trajectory, but it is an 
undesirable option due to the effects of negative g-forces on the systems and payloads.  
Furthermore, unapproved changes in altitude while on an IFR flight plan may unsafely 
complicate the scenario for both controllers and operators.  
For these reasons, avoidance through a change in the horizontal plane is preferred.  
Analysis was performed to calculate the time necessary to complete a horizontal 
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r=f(v, φ) ω = f(v, φ)
rf =500´ 
s
b Problem : Time (tf) for a separation >500´
b=s=v*tf (flt paths)
θ=s/r= ω*tf
γ = (90 - θ/2),  ϕ=(90 - γ)= θ/2
a=2r*sin( θ/2)
(rf )2 = b
2
+a 2-2ab*cos( ϕ)  (by Law of Cosines) θ
a 
Pos´n @ tf
ϕ   γ 
Figure 9: Avoidance Maneuver, General Solution 
maneuver.  Figure 9 shows the geometry for the generalized (no specific velocity or bank 
angle) worst case scenario.  In this scenario, a warning was given at the minimum alert 
time based on a predicted collision at time (tf) if the aircraft continued on flight path (b).  
The time (tf) is measured from the conclusion of the reaction time mentioned previously.  
The aircraft miss distance (rf ) must be a minimum of 500’ as defined by the FAA.  The 
aircraft’s actual trajectory (s) is based on the maximum response performed during the 
reaction time which results in the bank angle (φ).  For illustration a right turn is used, but 
it is done so without any loss of generalization.  The solution is achieved using the Law 
of Cosines, the derivation of which can be found in any geometry textbook.  Any changes 
in altitude or reductions in airspeed will improve the separation distance.  
The turn radius and the turn rate of an aircraft in level flight can be solved using the 
following equations derived by the USAF Test Pilot School30:  
v
1-nand;
1-n
v  r 
2
2
2 g
g
== ω  4.1 & 4.2 
where 
v – velocity 
g – force of gravity 
n – load factor; which is equal to the inverse of the cosine of the bank angle. 
r – turn radius 
ω – turn rate 
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Combining the equations of the generalized solution with equations 4.1 and 4.2 
yields the following: 
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with all values defined as in Figure 9 and equations 4.1 and 4.2 listed previously. 
The INTA study sought to deduce the proper values for the variables in the above 
equation.  It concluded that a maximum bank angle (φ) of 45° should be used for several 
reasons.  First, many UAVs and small aircraft are limited in bank angle to 60°.  A 
maximum rate turn should not be performed to the maximum allowable bank angle due to 
the consequences overshooting the bank angle limit.  Secondly, the short timeline limits 
the amount of time available to execute the maneuver.  The study found that the UAVs 
were capable of roll rates between 20 and 30° per second; these are common values of 
normal small aircraft.  At these roll rates, higher bank angles would require more time 
than allotted for the execution of the maneuver.  Thirdly, as the bank angle increases 
beyond this value, the viewing geometry (for pilot or sensor) becomes a factor.  At some 
angle, dependent on aircraft type and viewing position, it will not be possible to keep the 
traffic in sight throughout the turn.  Finally, g-force, and the proportional accelerated stall 
speed, increase inversely to the cosine of φ which means the rate of increase becomes 
very high at high angles.   
Since some aircraft may have other factors which require using a different value for 
the maximum bank angle, the general equation was solved for a range of φ and is 
presented in Figure 10.   
One example of additional limitations is that satellite links frequently limited UAVs 
to φ= 15° during beyond LOS operations.  The INTA study found that this should be 
programmed as a “soft stop”, but, if necessary, the DSA system should be allowed the 
maximum φ.  The maneuver duration will be very short, so the link may not be lost.  If it 
is lost, automated procedures for re-establishing the satellite connection are possible once 
the aircraft has returned to level flight. 
A fact that is not intuitively obvious, but that falls out of the calculations, is that the 
warning time requirement is not speed dependent.  The required detection distance is 
proportional to the closure velocity, but the turn rate is inversely proportional to closure 
velocity.  In the time to collision calculations these two factors cancel out the speed 
dependence. 
Based on the above study, and using equation 4.3, the time necessary to complete 
the avoidance maneuver with a φmax = 45° is tf  = 5.7 seconds.   
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Fig ure 9 : Time to Clear Traffic  (by bank  ang le)
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Figure 10: Time to Clear Traffic (by Bank Angle) 
 
As already mentioned, studies show that the human level of safety is not 
sufficient.31  To illustrate this, we use equation 3.1: 
c
-c v
R  t =  (3.1) 
as defined in Section 3.  Using the optimal human performance values listed in 
Table 5 (R=1.84 NM and necessary tc- = 18.2 sec), the maximum closure velocity (vc_max) 
safely protected by human see and avoid is: 
vc_max = 364 knots    Human ability, optimal. 
This does not take into account the human scan rate.  The FAA recommends that 
pilots rescan every 16 seconds.  More frequent complete area scans are a worthy goal but 
difficult to achieve during high task operations.  At this recommended rate, any particular 
area of view is only observed once every 16 seconds.  With this necessary time to 
collision (tc- = 34.2 sec), the maximum safe closure velocity is: 
vc_max = 194 knots    Human ability, practical. 
GA aircraft are normally performance limited to less than 150 knots, so the optimal 
value would seem to be sufficient; however, aircraft can legally fly at speeds of 200 knots 
in airport areas and 250 knots elsewhere (refer to Section 2.1.1) below 10,000´.  This 
means aircraft below 10,000´ in Class E or higher airspace must be able to prevent 
against collisions with closure velocities up to 500 knots (two aircraft traveling head on at 
250 knots).  This corresponds to a required visual detection range of 4.8 NM.  Even 
considering the speed limited aircraft mentioned before (150 knots ownship means 
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closure velocity up to 400 knots), the required visual detection range is 3.8 NM or twice 
that of the human ability!  These results are compared to those for UAVs in Section 5.2.1. 
Due to the geometry, off angle traffic will have significantly lower closure 
velocities as shown by Equation 3.2.  The required time to collision reduces 
proportionally which means a DSA system capable of non-uniform scanning could be 
programmed to do a weighted distribution of scan time and increase effective system 
performance. 
Above 10,000´ there is no speed restriction except for those prohibiting supersonic 
flight.  With only the Mach limitation, closure velocities can theoretically be over 1200 
knots true air speed. However, at that altitude working transponders are required which 
means cooperative avoidance systems can be used.  As discussed, even in the absence of 
any ATS radar assistance systems such as ACAS are capable of deconflicting traffic at 
distances sufficient for all closure velocities of subsonic aircraft.   
4.2. Necessary Performance for UAVs 
ICAO provides two ways to determine if a new system is acceptably safe: (1) 
comparison to a reference system, and (2) evaluation of system risks against a threshold.  
The first method is a relative method in that all the characteristics of the new system are 
compared with the corresponding characteristics of a reference system that is already 
determined to be sufficiently safe.  The second method requires the advocating party to 
quantify the system performance and compare against an approved risk level.32 
Using method one, advocates of UAV operations have compared their systems 
against human performance.  This approach has been ill fated because of the evidence 
that discredits the sufficiency of the reference system (namely, accident reports that find 
unaided human performance legal but insufficient for some conditions).  Therefore, 
UAVs will ultimately have to prove their safety by method two. 
In reviewing the data of Table 5 with this approach in mind, the following 
adjustments must be made to the performance requirements.  
4.2.1. Revised Time to Collision 
As discussed previously, the time to collision capability of a system is a function of 
revisit rate, detection range, and/or resolution.  For determining what DSA system 
performance is necessary, the required performance should be modified to consider 
several factors.  At the time an alert is issued, the detection and recognition stages have 
already occurred.  This leaves 6.4 seconds of the timeline shown in Figure 8.   
UAVs being operated by satellite link (Class 2 and 3) will have a transmission time 
which must be added to the reaction time twice, once for the alert and once for the control 
message.  While the traffic speeds will be the same, UAVs will be limited by Class. 
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The transmission time delay consists of a propagation component and a relay 
processing component.  Propagation time is the result of transmission range divided by 
the speed of light.  This results in a time delay of 6.18 µsec per nautical mile.  Processing 
of the message will be negligible because the message size is small enough to be 
completely transmitted in a single transmission.  A total of one second for one-way 
transmission time is sufficient for world-wide coverage.  Autonomous DSA operation 
will not need this additional time except for operator override.  Modifying Figure 8 with 
these considerations results in the Figure 11.  
Using the equations given in Section 3, an automated system with the capability of 
resolution advisories and a revisit rate of 1 Hz could provide the necessary alert time to a 
pilot with a detection range of only 2.0 NM.  This improvement over the values quoted in 
Section 4.1 are due to the higher revisit rate and the reduction in time to react as shown in 
Figure 11.  A comparison of the human and automatic requirements is made in Figure 12. 
4.2.2. Field of Regard 
By ICAO regulation, all aircraft are responsible for taking action to avoid traffic in 
an area consisting of +/-110° in azimuth and +/-30° in elevation.  This means that UAVs 
must be able to do their part of deconfliction with any aircraft that enters this region.  
Additional coverage is desired from a “defensive driving” perspective, but meeting this 
FOR requirement satisfies the law.   
4.2.3. Traffic Volume 
This parameter insures that a DSA system would be able to cope with the highest 
traffic densities likely to be encountered.  Modern computers have no problem far 
exceeding this number of simultaneous predictions, but the system must be able to also 
prioritize in order to advise of the highest threat at all times. 
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Figure 11: Time to React to a Collision Threat, UAV Version 
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4.3. Proposed UAV Requirements 
Figure 12: Detection Range versus Time to Collision
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Based on the preceding sections, some basic requirements become apparent for all 
UAVs regardless of operation.  The following is a proposed list of requirements that 
should be met for all UAV flights within civil airspace: 
Certification: Be certified for flight in civil airspace.  This certification should state 
that, in addition to meeting applicable existent airworthiness requirements, UAVs 
demonstrate fault-tolerant flight control, data link, and flight termination systems.   
Approved airfields: Operate only out of airfields approved for UAV operations.   
Preflight: File an IFR flight plan in accordance with all IFR requirements.  Flight 
plan will indicate UAV status and secondary method for contact (e.g. land line). 
Communications: Maintain communication with applicable ATS at all times. 
Navigation: Maintain a contingency flight plan in the event of loss of 
communication.  The contingency plan will be dynamically updated to remain in 
accordance with procedures for radio out (NORDO) IFR throughout the flight. 
Identification: Broadcast and receive a Mode S transponder signal regardless of 
airspace requirements for piloted aircraft.   
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The first two requirements are reasonable and most sources are in consensus.  This 
gives the national authority control over what is approved.  Once the requirements are 
specified, the advocating organization will have a clear process for securing approval.  
Being on an IFR flight plan is reasonable since, in essence, the operator is flying IFR.  
The communications requirement can be met in one of two ways as discussed below.  
The requirement for a loss of communication procedure that meets IFR NORDO 
requirements is a logical extension of the requirements for piloted aircraft.  The 
contingency flight plan must be dynamic because the proper course of action will vary 
based on stage of flight and what ATS clearances have been received prior to 
communication failure.  The Mode S requirement may soon become a requirement for all 
powered flight in controlled airspace.  For now, it should alleviate concerns among the 
commercial community as they will be able to detect and avoid all UAVs at great 
distances. 
In addition to those overarching requirements, the necessary equipment by UAV 
Class is listed in Table 5.  With the implementation of these modifications, the derived 
necessary level of performance for DSA systems to be used on UAVs is listed in Table 6.  
As demonstrated in Section 4.1, these requirements provide a greater level of safety 
than what is required of piloted aircraft.  This is in order to meet the necessary level of 
safety.  Due to their ability to travel beyond LOS, Class 2 and 3 UAVs must have satellite 
links.  Their radio communications will also have to be relayed to the GCS via satellite as 
ATS will not be LOS with the GCS.  Class 1 UAVs are not required to have a satellite 
link for control and can provide the link through some means other than onboard radios.   
 
 
Table 5: UAV Proposed Requirements 
Class Description ATS Communication ACAS DSA DSA autonomous 
operation allowed 
3 HALE Onboard radio & Sat. 
data link 
Yes Yes Yes 
2 MALE Onboard radio & Sat. 
data link 
Yes Yes3 No 
1 Short range GCS com. with ATS 2 No 4 Yes 3 No 
  0 1 Mini and micro No No No  --- 
Notes: 
1. Class 0 will not operate in civil airspace except by the COA process already in place. 
2. Class 1 UAV communication requirement may be met through direct link between ATS and GCS. 
3. In airspace with full radar coverage and operational TIS-B: DSA requirement may be met by 
     ACAS system capable of ADS-B.  Radar coverage can be general ATS or specific UAV support. 
4. Except operations above 10,000´ require ACAS due to increased traffic speeds. 
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Table 6: DSA Necessary Performance for UAVs 
Parameter Required Performance Notes 
Time to Collision 
Warning 
Class 3 & 2 14.2 sec 
Class 1 12.2 sec 
 
Sufficient for a safe miss distance (>500’) below 10,000´.1 
 
Value is for head-on traffic.  Less for off angle traffic.  
Detection Range & 
Revisit Rate 
Minimum to achieve time 
requirements above: 
Class 3 & 2 2.0 NM 
Class 1 1.4 NM  
Sufficient to achieve tracking within warning time 
requirement. 
Resolution -- Sufficient to achieve tracking at required range including 
worst case scenario ambiguities. 
Field of Regard  +/-110° Azimuth 
+/-30° Elevation 
Required performance: Those dictated in the ICAO “Right of 
Way rules”. 
Desired performance:  Total spherical area.  
Traffic Volume > 10 Busiest airspace densities for UAV operation 
Note: 
1:  Includes transmission, reaction, and maneuver time; also, for Classes 2 & 3, propagation time. 
 
 
 
The International Technical Committee on Unmanned Air Vehicle Systems (ASTM 
F38) has created a standard for DSA systems, Standard F 2411-04.  It was created after 
input from many segments of the aviation community.  It is still unclear if aviation 
regulatory agencies will embrace this new standard for certification purposes.33 
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5. DSA Analysis of Alternatives 
To meet the requirements specified in Section 4, multiple possibilities exist.  Figure 
13 shows several key regions of the electromagnetic spectrum.  Any feasible DSA 
solution will likely operate in one of these regions due to their atmospheric 
transmissivity, which is important for achieving the range requirement.  
Studies by Amphitech have ranked the performance requirements for possible 
technologies that would operate in those areas of the spectrum.34  Their conclusions are 
shown in Table 7.  They refer to the FOR as the scan envelope but otherwise use the 
same proposed requirements mentioned above.  
This information is not complete, however.  The higher ratings for systems in the 
lower frequencies like millimeter wave (MMW) radar are based on the effect that 
moderate rain and fog have on higher frequency systems.  By definition, these weather 
conditions are instrument meteorological conditions (IMC).  By regulation, IMC requires 
all aircraft to operate under IFR.  Being able to protect against possible traffic that is not 
on an IFR flight plan, not using a transponder, and flying through fog might be nice, but 
it has never been mandatory.   
In addition, as discussed in Section 4, there is a trade off between FOR, revisit rate, 
and range (or resolution in the case of electro-optics).  Thus, technologies with inherent 
abilities in one area can make trade offs for improvement in others to make an affordable 
alternative that still meets the time to collision warning requirement.  Given this, a new 
analysis of these technologies is listed in Table 8 rearranged by order of their place on the 
electromagnetic spectrum. 
 
   
Figure 13: A tm osp h eric T ran sm ission  p er N M  (S ea  L evel) 
(S ou rce: N A W C W PN S  H an d book T P 8347)  
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 Table 7: Amphitech Evaluation of DSA Technology Performance  
Sensor technology Scan envelope Time to Collision Revisit rate Resolution Adverse weather
Laser Radar Excellent Fair Poor Excellent Poor 
35 GHz MMW radar Excellent Excellent Fair Excellent Fair 
94 GHz MMW radar Excellent Fair Fair Excellent Fair 
Visible Imaging Excellent Poor Excellent Fair Poor 
IR Imaging Excellent Poor Excellent Fair Poor 
Passive MMW imaging Excellent Poor Fair Poor Excellent
 
 
Table 8: Revised Evaluation of DSA Technology Performance  
Sensor technology Time to Collision Accuracy FOR 
Visible Imaging Marginal due to range Satisfactory Satisfactory 
IR Imaging Marginal due to range Satisfactory Satisfactory 
Laser Radar Marginal due to revist Satisfactory Satisfactory 
Passive MMW Imaging Unsat. due to range Unsat. due to resolution Satisfactory 
MMW radar Satisfactory Satisfactory Satisfactory 
 
 
The following sections will evaluate all known DSA proposals and applicable 
technologies in order of spectral region.  System performance and physical characteristics 
can be estimated, but other requirements such as interoperability issues, human factors, 
and logistical concerns require evaluations on a specific product. 
5.1. Visual Imaging 
This technology consists of using some form of camera arrangement to establish 
situational awareness.  It is the most analogous process to that of piloted see and avoid.  
Visual imaging is a semi-passive system in that no onboard illumination is needed for 
detection.  Modern camera technology holds great possibility for small, low power 
cameras with very good zoom capabilities.  In the future, a virtual reality system could 
theoretically give the remote operator the same visual scan as an onboard pilot, but the 
bandwidth and equipment requirements would not justify its use simply for DSA.  A 
more realistic option is using image processing and a target recognition algorithm to 
analyze the input for the operator.  Several options discussed below have taken this route.  
The operator could still be in the loop by cueing cameras to focus on places interest. 
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The primary weakness of these systems is that they are limited in the same way as 
the human vision.  Some technologies (such as those used for night vision goggles, 
NVGs) will give satisfactory performance at night, but visual systems degrade greatly in 
the presence of water vapor such as rain and fog.  As mentioned before, this may not 
exclude their use as a DSA system since other cooperative systems can be made the 
primary for IMC. 
Another inherent difficulty with electro-optical imaging systems is that, unlike 
radar, they do not have the capability to directly measure range.  This is a big drawback 
for DSA systems as this is the primary parameter for calculating traffic avoidance.  One 
possibility is stereoptic vision with sensors on the wing tips.  This would use the same 
principle as the human brain to discern the distance of an object by simultaneously 
viewing it from two different angles.  Unfortunately, this method is only effective at short 
distances.  Beyond those distances the human being uses assessments of the apparent size 
of an object to determine distance.35  A computer could do this as well, but it must know 
the actual size of the object.  Range rate can be determined simply by measuring the rate 
of change in apparent size, but requires very high resolution systems as the apparent size 
of an object does not change rapidly until the distance is very small.  A more probable 
solution to the range problem is to combine the electro-optical system with an eye-safe 
invisible laser range designator as discussed in the section for lasers. 
There are currently no visual imaging DSA systems in use.  The following are 
reviews of applicable technologies and proposals.  
5.1.1. Panospheric Cameras 
Athena and Carnegie-Mellon University have developed a 4 million-pixel, 
panospheric, (that is, 360-degree view) electro-optical camera with a vertical FOR of 
+10° and -80°.36  Panospheric imaging is a technology developed by a Panoramic 
Viewing Systems, Inc. in Canada.  This level of resolution and FOR is excellent for DSA 
applications, but it creates difficulties for the onboard image processing system and data 
link bandwidth.  Also, there are processing challenges to correct the distorted image 
created by the sensor’s spherical mirror.  
By review, this system will be able to meet the FOR requirement and fit within the 
physical limitations.  Revisit rate would also not be a limitation.  There still remain the 
possible critical limitations on range and accuracy.   
5.1.2. Detection Algorithms 
Graduate students at The Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm are doing 
thesis work on creating efficient detection algorithms for DSA systems. They point out 
that current algorithms suffer greatly by factors such as light conditions and the 
background clutter.  Also, current common market video cameras do not have sufficient 
resolution to meet both the range and FOR requirements.  This problem is expected to be 
reduced as high resolution cameras become sufficiently miniaturized in the future.37   
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A review of their research indicates that, at this time, these algorithms are not 
mature enough for use in actual systems.  It is still not certain if better image processing 
alone will be sufficient to overcome the limitations of this area of the spectrum. 
5.1.3. Optical TCAS for UAVs 
Aurora Flight Sciences Corporation has proposed to combine low-cost visual image 
processing devices from the automotive market and the encounter logic developed for 
ACAS to create an "Optical TCAS".  The company plans to use panospheric mirrors to 
achieve 360° coverage without complex scanning systems.  The visual image processing 
devices are currently being developed by Mercedes-Benz as automotive collision 
avoidance devices.  To test this system, they propose to use their "Chiron" optionally 
piloted aircraft, which, similar to Proteus, can operate as a UAV, but with a safety pilot 
onboard.38 
By paper analysis, this system, if developed, will be a lightweight alternative that 
will meet the FOR and revisit requirement.  Still, there is no mention of how to overcome 
the physical limitation on range as discussed above.  
5.1.4. Modified Missile Detection Technology 
The US Air Force Research Laboratory Sensors Directorate (AFRL/SN) is 
addressing the see and avoid challenge with an initiative called the Air Traffic Detection 
Sensor System (ATDSS).  They have funded Defense Research Associates, Inc. (DRA), 
to pursue a passive moving target detection system using low cost optical sensors, 
processors, and DRA’s proprietary software originally developed for missile detection 
systems. 39  
No initial analysis is possible, but all the same inherent limitations make this a 
technical high risk alternative.  
5.1.5. Ranger Cameras 
A similar system called Ranger was proposed at the AUVSI 04 conference.  It 
would use 4 cameras and an algorithm using image processing to detect traffic.  No 
further details are available. 
5.2. Infrared 
As shown in Figure 12, the infrared (IR) region is just lower in frequency (higher in 
wavelength) than the visible spectrum.  This technology takes advantage of the fact all 
objects radiate energy at a quantity proportional to their temperature.  Aircraft will have a 
temperature contrast with the surrounding sky.  Unless used with an IR illuminator, these 
systems are passive; their detection is based on received energy only.  IR systems are in 
the electro-optical area of the spectrum and share many of the same properties and 
limitations of systems in the visible range.  They also have the physical limitations in the 
presence of water vapor such as rain and fog, but not as significantly as visible imaging.  
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A typical IR system requires a signal to clutter ratio greater than 19 in order to achieve a 
99% probability of detection.40  Also, these systems must have target recognition 
algorithms to analyze the information.   
Though IR search and track (IRST) systems have been used by the military, there 
are currently no IR DSA systems in use.  The only known proposal is a NASA and US 
Navy effort to develop a supplementary IR-based DSA system with a FOR of +/-105° in 
azimuth and +/- 35° in elevation.41 
5.3. Laser Radar 
This technology operates in the visible and near-IR spectrum.  A laser (light 
amplification through stimulated emission of radiation) is a system capable of generating 
an intense coherent beam of light.  This beam is less susceptible to the atmospheric 
attenuation of other electro-optical systems.  When reflected this beam can be sensed by a 
detector which can determine the distance of the reflected object.  A laser detection and 
ranging (LADAR) system takes advantage of this feature to make accurate range 
measurements at long distances.  Since the range is a part of each sensed beam, the 
system is capable of providing a three dimensional perspective of the reflection.  Some 
sources also used the term light detection and ranging (LIDAR) and include the use of 
ultraviolet lasers as well.  Figure 14 shows the various lasers currently available and their 
spectral positions. 
The advantages and limitations of LADAR systems are both related to their very 
precise focused beam.  LADAR systems provide high resolution in range and angle, but 
to cover a sufficient FOR they require very fast scanning, and real time signal processing.   
 
 
Figure 14: Laser M ateria ls by Spectral Position  
(Source: NAW CW PNS H andbook TP 8347) 
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5.3.1. LIDAR and Fish-eye Lenses 
Engineering 2000 has proposed to use LADAR technology to detect obstacles 
within a full 360 degree sphere.  Their proposed system would first use what they call 
fish-eye optics imaging systems to identify potential collision threats and then a LADAR 
system to acquire range and closure rate. 42 
There are no performance specifications to analyze with this system, but it appears 
to take advantage of the strengths of the two technologies reviewed so far.  That is, the 
wide FOR of visual imaging systems with the precision of LADAR.  This has the 
possibility of achieving all performance goals while still being within limits of cost and 
size for small UAVs.  Though not yet mature, this option is recommended for further 
investigation (See Section 6). 
5.3.2. Strategic Defense Initiative Application 
New Vistas International has proposed a system using radar and electro-
optical/infrared sensors.  The small gimbaled system leverages radar technology 
developed in the strategic defense initiative program and later adapted for helicopter 
obstacle avoidance systems made by Canada’s Amphitech International. 43 
No initial analysis is possible; the biggest issue of doubt is how a system requiring 
so much sensor equipment will be able to fit within the physical limitations of most 
UAVs and small aircraft.   
5.4. Passive MMW 
Like IR systems, this technology takes advantage of the fact that all objects radiate 
as a function of their temperature.  As a passive system, it has the advantage of being low 
power, but it suffers in range and accuracy performance.  Most likely due to these 
limitations, no known systems are being investigated to exploit this technology for the 
purposes of DSA.   
5.5. Radar 
Radar (radio detection and ranging) systems have been used to detect aircraft for 
decades.  Their processing systems are very mature and their performance in all 
conditions is very well known.  Like LADAR, which was derived from radar principles, 
it is an active system that sends strong pulses of energy and analyzes the returned signal.  
Two locations of interest in the radar area of the spectrum are at 35 and 94 GHz.   
The need for large external apertures makes radar systems difficult to implement on 
small UAVs.  Propeller driven aircraft have an even more difficult time dealing with the 
interference issues that the propeller and engine can cause.  Pusher propeller 
configurations allow for the installation of radar in the nose, but the size, weight, and 
power requirements make them still currently unfeasible.   
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5.5.1. OASys Ka-band Radar 
NASA´s optionally piloted aircraft, the Proteus, has performed tests with a 35 GHz 
(Ka band) radar based DSA system developed by Amphitech.  The OASys (Obstacle 
Awareness System) radar detailed in Table 9, and shown in Figure 15, is mounted on the 
chin of the Proteus.  Designers set a range objective requirement of 6 NM.  Initial NASA 
tests found the system was capable of detection ranges between 2.5 to 6.5 nautical miles, 
but there were some complete misses.  The system is currently being redesigned by 
Amphitech. 
Based on NASA´s flight test results, this system comes close to meeting all 
necessary performance requirements listed in Section 5.  These are shown in Table 10.  
Regarding physical characteristics, the total weight is about 55 pounds and the externally 
mounted antenna is 16”x16”x22”.   The system requires 250 W and costs $170,000.  One 
potentially critical problem is in the area of physical interference.  Aircraft with forward 
propellers will have a very difficult time finding a place to mount a complete radar and 
gimbaled platform.  This option is recommended for larger aircraft (Class II and III 
UAVs) that can afford the cost and weight penalty and require the autonomous DSA 
performance that this system offers (See Section 6). 
5.5.2. Ultra-wideband Radar 
Multispectral Solutions Inc. (MSSI) has engineered an ultra-wideband (UWB) radar 
prototype. It is lightweight and employs standard, printed circuit board packaging, the 
device radiates about 0.25 watt instantaneous peak power.  The primary application for 
this system is micro-UAVs whose main concerns are flying amongst trees and buildings 
at very close range.  This system is not capable of the ranges necessary for aircraft traffic 
avoidance. 
 
Table 9: Evaluation of OASys 35 GHz Radar 
Parameter System Performance Notes 
Time to Collision  based 
on:  
-- Detection Range &  
-- Revisit Rate 
 
 
2.5 –6.5 NM 
150°/sec 
Generally sufficient for UAVs 
Resolution e 1.7 mrad Sufficient to achieve tracking within 
warning time requirement 
Tracking Accuracy Range:  <5 m 
 
Sufficient to achieve tracking at 
required range including worst case 
scenario ambiguities. 
Field of Regard  Typical: AZ: +/- 30°, EL: +/- 11° 
Max: AZ: +/- 90°, EL: +25° & - 85° 
Less than the ICAO requiremnet.  
Other Altitude limitation of 20k´ Problem for most UAVs 
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Figure 15: OASys Radar on Proteus 
(Source: NASA website, Permission granted)  
 
5.6. Off Board Assistance 
Performing DSA through off board assistance is attractive for several reasons 
including cost, weight penalty, and minimized integration issues.  In this approach, 
ground-based systems perform the detection operations.  This information is then sent to 
the aircraft by a data link system such as TIS-B discussed in Section 2.3.  In areas where 
ATS supports TIS-B, the traffic data can be received from the TIS-B system in the same 
way as other aircraft.  For areas of desired UAV operation that are not serviced by a TIS-
B system, new systems would have to be installed.  
This option exceeds all requirements, is very light, and relatively inexpensive.  
These reasons make it seem perfect for the DSA function, except that is fails to meet the 
primary assumption of see and avoid; that is, independence.  Advocates of this option as 
the sole means of DSA are facing a very challenging approval task because the 
fundamental purpose of DSA in modern aviation is to be able to maintain safe operations 
even when all outside systems fail. (See Section 6).   
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6. UAV Type-Specific Recommendations  
Given the complete requirements as listed above, and after a through examination 
of the available technology, the following are recommended approaches for particular 
UAV scenarios:   
For small propeller-driven UAVs, there are currently no solutions that are fully 
satisfactory.  The most promising is the use of an off board system such as TIS-B 
discussed in Section 2.3.  This system is not fully proven, and has not been approved as a 
primary DSA system.  The obvious advantages, as discussed in Section 2.3.5, are low 
size/weight and low cost.  In addition, installation on existing UAVs will require much 
less integration than other options.  The US Navy is investigating this option.  No 
information is currently available regarding their plan on development.  Test agencies in 
Spain are lobbying their aviation authority for approval to use this option for both their 
military and national police.  If approved, this would at least allow the beginnings of 
UAV operations in civil airspace while other technologies mature.  The disadvantage of 
this option is that it is not independent.  This limits where a UAV could operate and 
forces dependence on another organization.  The Spanish have relatively few areas of 
interest and many small UAVs.  For a situation such as this, the expense and logistical 
challenges of such construction will ultimately be less difficult than outfitting every UAV 
with expensive and heavy equipment as is required for other options. 
For aircraft that must have fully independent DSA, such as those used in tactical 
military applications or to cover large distances, the best onboard alternative is a 
combined visual and LADAR system as mentioned in Section 5.3.1.  Such systems are 
currently only in development, but they hold great promise.  In addition to having the 
possibility of meeting the evaluation requirements listed in this report, these systems 
would have the military advantage of inherent low probability of interception (LPI).  
At this time, radar systems such as the OASys are the most mature.  For larger 
UAVs tasked with strategic or high loiter missions, a radar system is a good selection.  
The Spanish are looking into a multi-function radar option that could fulfill the tasks of 
ground tracking, weather tracking, and DSA.  The expense and weight of such systems is 
still prohibitive for most classes of UAVs, but future developments promise to bring both 
the price and the weight down.   
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Conclusion  
As it has been shown, UAVs bring the potential for enormous public benefit.  The 
market for their use in the plethora of possibilities is driving the revisions of all aspects of 
aviation safety.  Regulations will always lag behind what available technology makes 
possible, but, as shown, their careful modification must be a part of any solution for safe 
UAV operation in public skies.  Also, developments in ATM such as ADS-B and TIS-B 
come at a very good time for the UAV community. 
The test and evaluation guidance given in this report is independent of the 
technology being tested and can be used as a guide for all future DSA testing.  That 
section is very similar in format to typical avionics test plans, but the unique DSA 
function requires the key differences.  Unlike the timeless nature of the test guidance, the 
recommendations section depicts the best options for the present time.  The currently 
available options leave much to be desired, but as these technologies mature they should 
compare more favorably against the necessary requirements listed herein. 
If the predictions of most aviation leaders come true, the next decade will see an 
explosion in the number and variety of DSA systems.  To prepare for this, regulatory 
agencies must be knowledgeable of the necessary performance of these systems, and 
UAV developers must be ready to quantitatively evaluate the options.  This report aims to 
have provided the necessary information for both. 
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